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The Case for Compatibilism

Image result for woman eating in restaurant

 Most readers will surely know by now that I am what is known as an "incompatibilist." I believe that determinism as to human behavior is incompatible with moral judgment. 

 Today, though, I would like to simply quote a gentleman who recently made the case for compatibilism in the comment section of another blog. It is a very well put statement of the point, and I'll quote it today without further comment or contention. 

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A woman goes into a restaurant, sits down, peruses the menu for a minute, and then calls the waiter over to give him her order.
We cannot see what is going on in her head. But, assuming she has a normal brain, we expect it to be similar to what happens when we do the same thing, read a menu, evaluate our options, and place an order.
We call this empirical event “choosing”. Options are presented, evaluated by some comparative criteria, and a choice is output.
So, we know what happened (a choice was made) and we know who did it (the woman in the restaurant). There are no “illusions” involved here. It is simply an empirical fact.
As to whether she was “free” to decide for herself what she “will” do, that too seems to be a matter of empirical fact. We saw no one holding a gun to her head, literally or figuratively, and telling her what to order.
So, her freedom, to make the choice herself, also seems to be a matter of empirical fact, and not any kind of “illusion”.
But, wasn’t her choice causally inevitable? Wasn’t it a result of her own genetic dispositions and tastes, her own beliefs and values, her own life experiences, her own thoughts and feelings, her own neurology?
Of course it was. But all of that stuff is her. None of those things were external to who and what she was at the time she made her choice.
So, it appears that causal necessity and free will are not incompatible after all. (A) Whenever someone decides for themselves what they will do, according to their own purpose and their own reasons, then it is authentic free will. (B) Whenever someone decides for themselves what they will do, according to their own purpose and their own reasons, then it is authentic determinism.
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  1. HenryMarch 15, 2018 at 6:59 AM

    Regarding your opening remark, how could anyone claim that determinism is compatible with moral judgment? I don't see how it could be. Of course, if determinism is true, then we should still morally condemn, so as to make our condemnation a deterministic factor for the future, and thereby a deterrence to repetition of the conduct that we morally condemn.

    Regarding the quotation, paragraph 4 states, "So, we know what happened (a choice was made) ." We do not know that. We know only that a choice appears to have been made.

    Paragraph 5 states, "We saw no one holding a gun to her head, literally or figuratively, and telling her what to order." One cannot see determinism. A "choice" that was determined looks the same as one that was free (supposing the latter to be possible).

    Paragraph 8 states, "But all of that stuff is her." Yes, but that does not mean that she exercised free will. She could not choose (quoting paragraph 7) "her own genetic dispositions and tastes, her own beliefs and values, her own life experiences, her own thoughts and feelings, her own neurology." If those things determined her choice, then her choice was determined. Someone once insisted to Freud that one is not responsible for one's dreams. Freud replied, "Then who is responsible?" But Freud was joking, playing on the double meaning of "responsible." The writer here is making the same error, but not jokingly.

    In the final paragraph, "authentic free will" and "authentic determinism" are defined identically. The word "authentic," by the way, adds nothing.

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    1. ChristopherMarch 15, 2018 at 8:50 AM

      Good points. All well summarized by Robert Nozick. I'm working from memory here, but I believe it was Nozick who asked rhetorically, "Would we rather be hand puppets than marionettes?".

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    2. HenryMarch 15, 2018 at 9:05 AM

      Christopher, could you answer my first question, which addressed your comment and not the writer's, and which was not rhetorical?

      Delete
    3. HenryMarch 15, 2018 at 9:08 AM

      Also, was Nozick implying that there were two types of determinism? If not, then he could have asked, "Would we rather be hand puppets or hand puppets?"

      Delete
    4. ChristopherMarch 15, 2018 at 9:30 AM

      (I've replied to these as comments to the blog post, rather than as replies proper to your comment.)

      Delete
  2. ChristopherMarch 15, 2018 at 9:16 AM

    Henry, Many philosophers -- perhaps a majority of those who have addressed the issue in recent years -- have been compatibilists in the sense I have in mind. So obviously it is possible. Sam Harris and Daniel Dennett have each recently written in this vein at some length. The general line of thought seems to be: Events are caused and we do assign praise and blame, so the two facts ARE plainly compatible. They can exist within the same universe. On the significance of the compatibilism/incompatibilism opposition, my post tomorrow may give you some further idea.

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    1. HenryMarch 15, 2018 at 9:29 AM

      Whether we assign praise and blame, and whether it makes sense to do so, are separate questions. We do assign them, and it doesn't make sense. As I said above, we should assign praise and blame because the desire for praise and the desire to avoid blame are deterministic factors. But we don't assign praise and blame for that reason. Rather, we assign praise and blame because it FEELS as if we have free will.

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  3. ChristopherMarch 15, 2018 at 9:19 AM

    As to Nozick, he was only suggesting poetically what you have just spelled out. There is determination by "stuff that is her" and there is determination by "stuff that is not her." Determinist compatibilists often seem to be saying that moral responsibility is assigned only to actions determined by stuff that is her, internally. So their idea presumably is that it is more fair to blame/credit puppets than marionettes.

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    1. HenryMarch 15, 2018 at 9:36 AM

      I see. I had not realized that Nozick meant puppets as a metaphor for internal determinants, and marionettes as a metaphor for external determinants. But, in fact, only internal factors are ultimately determinants. If you put a gun to my head and demand my wallet, and I give it to you, it is because internal determinants cause me to prefer to lose my wallet than to be shot. That preference, rather than the gun at my head, is the ultimate cause of my handing over my wallet.

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