Peter Baron, paraphrasing J.L. Mackie, offers an argument against the intuitionism that W.D. Ross and G.E. Moore (and I) share, in meta-ethics or (what is it seems to me the same) moral epistemology. The Baron/Mackie argument runs thus: 1. Objective moral values and the faculties that intuitionists posit to detect them are strikingly queer, or as Mackie put it, "utterly different from our ordinary ways of knowing everything else." 2. We should not believe in such a queer concept without very strong evidence. Lemma: We should not believe in objective moral values or a moral sense without very strong evidence. 3. There is little or no evidence in favor of these queer things. Conclusion: We should not believe in them. Notice that the article proceeds as two syllogisms, with the conclusion of the first serving as one of the premises of the second. The whole thing seems to me to be a bit of evidential gerrymandering. It is strikingly odd, even queer, that bright highly-trained