Rest in peace Paul Kallagas.
I read in Leiter's blog about his passing. Letter is just passing along what he encountered from a professor at McGill University.
Kalligas has been the leading scholar on the work of Plotinus, a great Greek philosopher of the third century AD (or, if you prefer, CE).
He wrote a three volume commentary on Plotinus' major work, the ENNEADS. Kalligas writes in (modern) Greek, but two volumes of these three are available in English.
Since this is our all-philosophy week, and since Kalligas would probably like it, let us quote a bit from Plotinus -- the founder of neoplatonism, a systematic re-working of Plato's Platonism.
Plotinus is nowadays much more read about than read. Most of those of us who read philosophy, or even read about, philosophy at all have essentially left Plotinus' texts as a reservation for such scholars as Kalligas.
But let us read one paragraph together.
Plotinus:
We may treat of the Soul as in the body — whether it be set above it or actually within it — since the association of the two constitutes the one thing called the living organism, the Animate. Now from this relation, from the Soul using the body as an instrument, it does not follow that the Soul must share the body's experiences: a man does not himself feel all the experiences of the tools with which he is working.
I love the logical step-by-step nature of this paragraph. He considered with imperious brevity the question of the LOCATION of the soul -- in the body or above it -- a question that would give Descartes considerable aggravation much later. The pineal gland?
Anyway, Plotinus considers the broad question just to set out aside. What matters is not where the soul is but what it is. It is the carpenter of whom our body is a tool.
And from this he passes on to another crucial step -- the soul need not share the body's experiences. Presumably the body HAS experiences that do not rise to the level of being en-souled. We might briefly wonder, in the spirit of the "tools" analogy, what experiences a hammer has as it is hitting a nail? On what is the carpenter missing out by virtue of the fact that he does not feel that?
Oh, yes, a little reflection makes us think that the carpenter is lucky not to feel that. Such feelings inherited from his tools would make the carpenter a much less effective carpenter. And THAT, I submit is Platonus' point. He is building an ontological hierarchy here.
I have no love of the ontological hierarchy proposed, but I admire the proposer's panache.
Christopher, since the soul does not exist, may I substitute "mind" for "soul" each time "soul" appears in your post, and "conscious" for "ensouled"? If I can't, then the post has no more meaning than if I substituted "unicorn" for "soul." (To keep it simple, let's understand "mind" to refer only to conscious mental states.)
ReplyDeleteIf I substitute "mind" for "soul," then Plotinus is saying that, if I decide to lift weights, then
my mind is directing my arms to grasp the weights and lift them. My mind will be conscious of my body to the extent that I feel the pressure of the lifting in some parts of my body, such as my arms and shoulders, but it will be unconscious of the effect that the lifting has on other parts, such as my internal organs other than, to a degree, my heart and lungs. If I have interpreted the quotation from Plotinus correctly, then it does not seem profound or even insightful.
Henry, Yes, I think we can refer to what Plotinus Evans here as "mind". Heck, we could get a bit more specific and call it intellect. There is some weight to what Plotinus has to say about it, and it is related to the distinction between "passive" and "active" intellect. I believe I have spoken of that in other posts in this blog. If not, I surely will soon.
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