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Interactionist Dualism Defended I





Here's a link to a philosophical defense of old-fashioned interactionist dualism, dated 2006 and submitted by a candidate for an M.A. in philosophy at Monash University.

I'll come to Koksvik's argument in another post, but for now I'll review my understanding of the state of play.

Interactionist dualism was famously Rene Descartes' answer to the question of the relationship between mind and body.

There exist a lot of different possible answers to this question, from the materialist reductionism that says in essence that the 'mind' is an illusion, to the Berkeleyan idealism that says in essence that the 'body' is an illusion.

Dualists all by definition say that mind and body are very different things or types of thing, and that they are both real.

Dualists differ among themselves on whether the mind and body really interact. They certainly SEEM to interact! If I skip lunch, the thought "I'm hungry" will be in my mind by 2 PM.  Then I might start hunting around for a bag of potato chips. So a bodily fact (empty stomach) seems to cause a thought, and that thought seems to cause a good deal of bodily rustling about.
 
But ... there are schools of thought among dualists who maintain that though both the empty stomach and the conscious thought regarding hunger are real, the interaction is an illusion. It is wrong to say that we are hungry because our stomachs are empty. Rather, one should say that the two facts are parallel parts of the grand divine plan, and since God is the direct cause of each, they don't cause each other. This sort of dualism is known as parallel dualism or occasionalism.

Another sort of dualism says that causation only works in one direction. Yes, I think "I'm hungry" because of the condition of my stomach. But nothing (not even my search for some potato chips) happens because of that thought. Rather, the search for food is set off automatically by the hungry stomach, mind is unnecessary. In this view, mind is a useless froth thrown out by the body, and all the work is done by matter. (Though, in contrast to materialists, a partisan of this view, an epiphenomenalist, DOES believe that the useless mind is a reality, and so he IS a dualist of a sort.)

Descartes' interactionist dualism was a rejection of all those possibilities. Things are in broad outline as they seem. The body really does cause changes in the mind, and vice versa.
 
That has come under a lot of critical fire in the intervening centuries, not least by "neutral monists" such as William James (in at least some of his writings) who maintain that there is an underlying metaphysical stuff that is neither matter nor mind, and that both matter and mind are pragmatically useful constructions from out of this stuff.
 
At any rate: by now, by the early 21st century, it is tough to find defenders of interactionist dualismin the top rank philosophy faculties. That view tends to be parodied by such expressions as "the ghost in the machine." [And that was true long before The Police used that as an album title.]
 
Best of luck to Koksvik. 
 
 

 

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