The 'tautological' argument for faith

Last week I mentioned three philosophical arguments that concern very different subjects (and have very different advocates) but that have this in common: their critics think them tautological.

Under the prodding of a commenter, I'd like to be more specific about one of them today.

Some people argue that belief in God is necessary, and thus that God's existence must be postulated even if His existence cannot be proven, because He serves as the foundation of moral behavior. Let us call this argument FFM (faith for morals).

The critics say this is tautological. Does God tell us not to commit adultery because it is a bad thing, or is it bad because He tells us not to do it?  According to the critics of FFM, the FFM argument must say "both." Thus, it falls into circularity and tautology.

Now particular advocates of FFM might well have expressed themselves in ways that sound like this. But that isn't a very interesting inquiry. A much more important inquiry is: on a charitable reading can FFM as we've just described it avoid tautology?

This is an oft-popularized form of Kant's position. After all, Kant was committed to the proposition that the existence of God cannot be established through reason. Reason on his view ("pure reason") establishes analytic truths (in essence tautologies) and it establishes synthetic a prior truths also. BUT it only establishes the synthetic a priori to the extent that it limits itself to the phenomenal. That was the "critical" part of the critical philosophy.

Practical Reason

 

So ... assuming that God is really real, noumenal, the kind of reason that can tell us about Him is practical reason. In the popularized version of the argument I have in mind, that is translated into "faith."

An argument might proceed this way:

1. We'd have to start with some definition of morality that requires that moral agents do things either for good reasons or with good reasons. The preposition matters: but if our idea of morality requires that action occur for good reasons, we are basing morality on psychology. Right action is action from the right motive.

2. We might also develop the view -- a matter of moral epistemology if you please-- that a reason requires a firm foundation. Right action is action from the right motive, and the right motive must be one that will remain reliable over time.

3. What kind of thing could be a firm foundation for moral action? The advocate of FFM could proceed by process of elimination, and find that the various non-theistic reasons adduced are inadequately firm.

Codicil to 3. Kant himself developed an elaborate logical argument -- without reference to God -- for the categorical imperative as a foundation of morality. So perhaps such logical arguments can serve as  as the foundation of moral behavior. But in such works as Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone he writes as if this is not adequate. Presumably he means that ordinary folks who don't take doctoral courses at the best German universities won't grasp the categorical imperative as a logical argument.

4. An advocate of FFM might maintain that, to the extent that atheists act morally, they do so accidentally. Only theists [or very highly educated philosophical atheists?] who act morally can be relied upon to keep doing so.

5. Thus, there is a good non-cognitive reason for postulating the existence of a God who will reward us for right action.

Now: does this argument fall into the Euthyphro trap? Does it amount to saying that, say, adultery is wrong because God tells us not to do it and God tells us not to do it because it is wrong?

From the Elite

I submit that it does not. The argument has its weaknesses, and I have tipped off my view of some of them even while stating it. But it isn't a tautology.

Adultery, within a monogamous society, is simply a specific instance of a broader phenomenon: promise breaking. An individual who has committed to a monogamous relationship should stick with that for the same reasons people in general should keep promises: should remember that they rely on the promises others in society make to them all the time, and that it is impossible to treat the injunction "I'll break this promise" as a universal law.

God, as an omniscient Being, presumably can reason at least as well as a German professor of philosophy, and prohibits us from committing adultery because He knows we make promises to each other and rely upon them etc.

This isn't a tautology, although one might fairly see it as rather elitist. The gist of it is that the elite, who really understand why adultery is wrong, have a good non-cognitive reason for seeking to persuade the masses, who might not, that there is a God who has issued that command.