"According to [Angelika] Kratzer, the verb 'can' in a sentence such as 'A can do B' always comes with an additional, often implicit qualification of the form 'in view of X.' This qualification, if not specified explicitly, is determined by the context in which the sentence is uttered. For example, when we talk about what is humanly possible, we might say, 'We can walk, run, and jump, but not fly,' thereby referring to what we can do by way of the constraints of human physiology. When we talk about how we get from London to Paris, we might say, 'We can fly, take the Eurostar travel train, or travel by overnight bus,' thereby referring to what we can do in klight of the available means of transport. W might add, however, 'We cannot fly or take the Eurostar, because those options are too expensive.' this time referring to what we can do in view of our financial constraints."
pp. 103-04
The point in the context of free will, List's subject here, relates to the notion that "we could have done otherwise." I took an action of my own free will if I could have done otherwise. This is a powerful intuition.
Indeed, in some insanity-defense contexts, (though I don't believe List mentions this) it has been a recurring argument in legal history that, "your honor, my client could not have refrained from firing that bullet into the crowd even if he had been aware of a policeman directly behind him." A sane, and thus criminally responsible, murderer would have been sneakier, he would have refrained had he been aware of the policeman, which means in general he could have done otherwise.
But List/Kratzer are making a plausible point when they say that the notion of "could have done otherwise" should be seen as always raising the question, 'in view of what?".
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