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The Fetish of Communication

Minima Moralia, German edition.jpg

Raymond Guess, a philosopher affiliated with the University of Cambridge, recently wrote about the evolution of the Frankfurt School of social philosophers. 
Guess observes that Adorno, in 1951, questioned the "liberal fiction which holds that any and every thought must be universally communicable to anyone whatsoever." We shouldn't make a fetish of communication or communicability, making it too fundamental an organizing principle. 
Guess adds that the Frankfurt school soon fell into the trap Adorno had warned about. Jurgen Habermas, in the early 1970s, introduced what Guess calls a "normatively highly charged concept of 'discourse'" and "communicative action" that does exactly this -- in the hope of reinvigorating a Kantian liberalism.
What d I think about all this? I will let you ... Guess. 




Comments

  1. Christopher,

    You don't say what Guess's view of this "liberal fiction" is, but, the lack of clarity of his language that you quote and paraphrase suggests that he disagrees with it. What does "normatively highly charged" mean? I suppose that it means "highly controversial." I suppose that he uses "communicative action" (which I assume should have an opening quotation mark) rather than "communication," because, whereas a communication communicates, a communicative action need not. Or maybe it too must communicate, but Guess prefers to use two words where one will due. I believe that "in the hope of reinvigorating a Kantian liberalism" means that Habermas thinks that discussing Kantian liberalism lucidly would reinvigorate it.

    I actually have some sympathy for Adorno's attack on the "liberal fiction." My sympathy derives from his use of the word "anyone" in "must be universally communicable to anyone whatsoever." (Note that his use of "anyone" makes "universally" redundant.) I am one who finds most continental philosophy incomprehensible (Heideggar, for example), not only because of its writing style but because of the apparent emptiness of its concepts, when someone who writes well explains them to me. I am therefore tempted to dismiss most continental philosophy as nonsense and its followers as people who claim that the naked emperor is wearing clothes. But I don't dismiss it, because too many people, including some whom I respect, such as Richard Rorty, take continental philosophy seriously. I conclude, instead, that continental philosophy is just not communicable to everyone, and that I am one of those to whom it is not communicable. Our brains are all different; some are more analytical, and some are more "continental" (I don't know what positive word to give them; "unanalytical" would be disparaging, and I am attempting not to disparage them.

    What do you think about all this? I'd rather not Guess.

    ReplyDelete
  2. I meant "where one will do" in the penultimate sentence of the first paragraph. That was a typo, not an attempt at cleverness.

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  3. Henry,

    Not only does "universal" make "anyone" redundant, but once you've put them together, it is really gilding the lily to end the sentence with "whatsoever."

    BTW, I took this from Leiter's blog, a June 24 post.

    As for "communicative action," the phrase reminded me of Skinner's "verbal behavior." And although I'd have to check out the dates, and I'm too lazy, the evocation might be deliberate. Skinner called language "verbal behavior" because he wanted psychology, and his sort of psychology, to swallow linguistics. Habermas in effect wanted them both to be swallowed by political philosophy. "Action" sounds more political than "behavior," does it not?

    There is lots more that I could say. I'm tempted to create a paleolithic psychodrama involving the creation of language. When Fred and Barney are out walking, and Fred is the first to see the saber toothed tiger, he wants to shout something at Barney that would roughly translate "watch out!" or "Let's run!" The pragma of language. But I continue to be reluctant to carry this further, so I'll still leaving you Guessing. This time with a little more material.

    Yabba Dabba Do!

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  4. "Communicative action" might also be intended to evoke "speech act."

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  5. Possibly, but I don't think so. Isn't a "speech act" supposed to be something like "I now pronounce you man and wife"? It seems a limited realm of "discourse" compared to what Habermas is trying to get at.

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