At the end of August I wrote here about Francesco Orsi's 2015 book, simply titled VALUE THEORY.
Here is a quote from the book, from a chapter called "Personal Value."
"The agent-relativized structure can make sense of a range of situations where we think it morally significant that the agent was involved. I need to repay my debt to my creditor, but I learn that I could help B repaying her higher debts to her creditors . But if I do this, I will be unable to pay my debts.... I have an overriding duty to repay my debt. According to agent-relative consequentialism, this is because repaying my debt is better relative to me than repaying others' debts. Analogous examples can be multiplied at will."
This makes sense to me. How sympathetic do we have to make B's distressed circumstances in order to release the agent relativity here?
Of course, as Orsi also says, this must be understood with a "ceteris paribus" clause. He doesn't expand on that but I will.
Suppose an elderly woman I know is about to be evicted and become homeless due to her large rent arrearage. My own housing is secure, but one of my consumer credit cards is about to be cancelled. I could easily meet my needs even after such a cancellation, although it would be at least annoying.
In that situation, I receive a windfall. A royalty check comes through from something I don't even remember I wrote, years ago, which has suddenly become popular in a reprinted edition in a foreign country. It would generally be considered a good thing for me to sacrifice one of my credit cards so that an elderly woman can be spared the trauma of eviction, homelessness, the need to apply to public authorities regarding space in a shelter, etc.
That said, I do have a duty to repay MY debt, arising from that fact that it arose out of my promise, express or implied, and I ought not go in search of evictees to help rather than to keep my promise when the royalty check comes through.
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