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The Uselessness of knowing the other side's attack plan in advance.


Three distinct events. Very different, but oddly the same. Three parallel controversies.   

December 1941. Japanese forces attack the US naval base at Pearl Harbor. Evidence indicates that the Office of Naval Intelligence was aware of Japanese carrier movements in the days before the attack -- that the attack should not have come as a complete surprise to Admiral Kimmel and others in command in Hawaii.  There is a theory that goes much further, contending FDR knew about Japan's plans and decided no counter-measures would be taken because this looked like a quick way to get the US fully engaged in the war.

September 2001. Islamofascist terrorists attack New York and the Pentagon. Evidence indicates a failure of communication, again, between intelligence and operations. A number of theories quickly develop going much further than that: one of them is , again, that the government knew exactly what would happen and allowed it, thereby also allowing its own imperialist "war on terrorism."

October 2023. Hamas terrorists cross the border between Gaza and Israel and kill roughly 1,200 Israelis, two-thirds of them civilians, taking 250 hostages. This was in accordance with a meticulous plan which the government of Israel had in its possession for a year. The usual range of theories is already on display. 

Can we generalize? I think so. Western nations exist under the protection of military and quasi-military bureaucracies, sometimes in a confusing net. These bureaucracies are sometimes aimed at gathering intelligence, at other times aimed at directing military operations. Those two parts of the confusing net do not communicate well with one another. 

The fact that a nation's intelligence knew of a coming attack, in general or even in great detail, does NOT by itself do a western power, otherwise vulnerable to such an attack, any good. 

This is an explanation for why certain events take place as they do in ways that allow and encourage the thriving of conspiracy theories. 

 

Comments

  1. There is possibly another generalization. Strategists, military or otherwise, don't necessarily put all eggs in one basket. A single plan, no matter how well-conceived, has room for error of some kind or other. Therefore, back up is advisable. Depending upon contingency, plan B may be superior to plan A.

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