As I observed in yesterday's entry, Mauser's project commits him to refuting an Humean argument. Yesterday I gave that argument in Mauser's paraphrase. Today I'll give it in Hume's own words.
"In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with," Hume wrote, "I have always remarked, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surprized to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is, however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, it is necessary that it should be observed and explained; and at the same time that a reason should be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it. But as authors do not commonly use this precaution, I shall presume to recommend it to the readers; and am persuaded, that this small attention would subvert all the vulgar systems of morality, and let us see, that the distinction of vice and virtue is not founded merely on the relations of objects, nor is perceived by reason."
He has in mind a situation like this:
1. Jones has made a promise to bring potato salad to the picnic.
2. His failure to bring potato salad will cause disappointment and perhaps even anger.
3. Jones is wealthy and can easily afford potato salad.
4. Jones ought to bring the potato salad.
For most of us, the first three statements there do seem to make up a good prima facie case in favor of the fourth, at least when we aren't philosophizing on such subjects. But Hume, who would describe the first three as "observations concerning human affairs," would point out that none of those three statements contains an "ought." So where does the "ought" in the conclusion, the fourth statement, come from? How can it possibly be a deduction from the others "which are entirely different from it"?
How does Mauser answer this objection to the sort of view he wants to defend?
What Mauser wants to do, specifically, is to ground statements about what Jones ought to do in broad facts that are true about Jones. He believes he can do this because the broadest facts that are true about Jones are themselves teleological -- that is they involve purpose. Purposes can be achieved or they can fail to be achieved.
One key fact that is true about Jones is that he is a rational creature who seeks what he perceives as good -- who seeks to perfect himself.
This suggests that oughts are right there in the premises, they don't have to be snuck into our reasoning at a later stage. "Certain facts entail values." They aren't facts about picnics, but they are facts about why we live in society and how it comes that we have to rely on one another's promises.
Guillotine blunted. Mission accomplished. Right?
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ReplyDeleteLet's say that implicit among the premises is "Jones is a rational creature who seeks what he perceives as good," and that "Jones perceives that keeping promises and not causing disappointment is good." But there is no "ought" in those premises, because Jones' perceptions may be inaccurate. Suppose that, on the morning of the picnic, Jones discovered that his potato salad was spoiled and it was not feasible to make or buy fresh potato salad on short notice. He would be mistaken if he nevertheless perceived that keeping his promise and not disappointing would be good. It would be better if he broke his promise and disappointed people than if he made them sick.
ReplyDeleteLet's substitute premises. Instead of "Jones is a rational creature who seeks what he perceives as good," we'll try "Jones is a rational creature who seeks the (objective) good." But then we have to add the premise that bringing the potato salad would be good. But this premise would be false if the potato salad were spoiled.
But suppose hypothetically that it were always good to keep promises and not disappoint. Wouldn't that "ought," even if a premise rather than a conclusion, have to be justified by an "is"? If so, what have we accomplished?