During the course of my last exchange with reader Henry on the Jamesian "will to believe" and related notions, I admitted that I had not done justice to the argument James is making in the final pages of VARIETIES OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE, and I promised to try again on another day. So this may as well be the day.
The material I have in mind begins in a minor key, in the middle of a chapter (Lecture XIX) unpretentiously titled "Other Characteristics." James had promised to treat of manifestations of religions his previous 18 lectures had neglected, and he had begun with its aesthetics, moving on to the practice and experience of prayer. Then he says, "The last aspect of religious life which remains for me to touch upon is the fact that its manifestations so frequently connect themselves with the subconscious part of our existence."
He means by "the subconscious part" what we in the early 21st century more often call the "subliminal," the existence of a world of both sensation and conduct below the level of awareness. Thus, I might while driving be intensely focused on what is going on in the road in front of me, but at some level be aware of what is coming into my ears via the radio. When the action on the road becomes more routine and less demanding of attention, perhaps at that very moment my favorite song comes on, that bit moves up into the level of awareness, I recognize the fact, and move to turn the radio up.
Indeed, in such a case my action turning the knob up may itself be automatic, unmediated by any sense that I am making a decision in the matter.
In the case of intensely religious people the activity going on underneath the threshold seems to be very strong, and seems to come into awareness not as a lot of small leaks but as powerful eruptions. and James notes that beliefs "are strengthened wherever automatisms corroborate them. Incursions from beyond the transmarginal region have a peculiar power to increase conviction."
James' discussion of such facts leads him naturally into the next chapter, Lecture XX, "Conclusions." For this sort of breaking-through is roughly speaking the Ur-experience that gives unity to the "varieties" of religious experience, and at the same time unites it with common experiences of the non-religious.
Now, suppose we entertain the hypothesis that the sense of a guiding presence, the sense of communication with an Other, that comes with such eruptions is not a delusion, but is an element in the situation. This is a more plausible route to a God than is, say, any amount of wonder at the marvelously fitting orbits of planets, because as James writes in this chapter on Conclusions, "so long as we deal with the cosmic and the general, we deal only with the symbols of reality, but as soon as we deal with private and personal phenomena as such, we deal with realities in the completest sense of the term." [Italics in original.]
The hypothesis that there really is a Being worth calling God behind many of the eruptions of the "more" into awareness is consistent with the common core of religious belief. Though beliefs are varied, and largely cancel each other out, the beliefs of those who feel their religion most intensely do overlap on the description of a certain uneasiness, and on the means to its solution.
The common core is that (1) there is something wrong with us, with human beings, as we stand in nature and as we observe each other there, and (2) that we can be saved from this wrongness by putting ourselves in touch with the higher powers/power, however we conceive of them/it. [In this point we can sense the significance that James had in the early development of Alcoholics Anonymous.]
This sense of being saved by getting in touch with the More is a psychological fact of "enormous biological worth" James said, checking in with his pragmatist gatekeeper. As indeed, we can see when it assists drunks in recovering sobriety and a sustainable manner of life. James was not inclined to believe that so widely useful a conviction can be entirely delusional. Something, some "actual inflow of energy," is involved "in the faith-state and the prayer-state."
And, although James doesn't mention this here, he was very involved in his final years in the serious study of psychic phenomenon, séances and the like, and suspected there was something other than bunkum there. The core beneath the layers of bunkum may be the fact that sometimes people are in touch with one another internally, through the "more" which each experiences on the hither side as subliminal knowledge. He does mention that in a Postscript added for the book, not in the original lectures.
But back to the conclusion of those lectures. "I can of course," James adds, "put myself into the sectarian scientist's attitude, and imagine vividly that the world of sensations and of scientific laws and objects may be all." But when he does that, his inward monitor tells him that that is bunkum.
Christopher,
ReplyDeleteI find this a good discussion of a psychological phenomenon, but I see nowhere in it "an argument for the (probable) existence of God)," to quote the title of the post. Rather, I see it "entertain[ing] the hypothesis that the sense of a guiding presence" is "a more plausible route to a God" than is some other psychological phenomenon (quoting from paragraph 7). I can't see how any psychological phenomenon can constitute an argument or evidence for the existence of a God, so I can't see how one can be more plausible than another.
I am also troubled by James' phrase, quoted in the final paragraph, "sectarian scientist's attitude." If he means that science is merely another religion, then I hope that he knows better.
There is an argument there, although I regret I still have not made that clear to you. Would a syllogistic formulation help?
ReplyDeleteMajor Premise: Psychological phenomena that are both widely shared and benevolent in their consequences are (probably) not delusional.
Minor Premise: The [two-part] core of religious belief as defined above is widely shared and benevolent in its consequences.
First conclusion: the two-part core is probably not delusional.
New Premise: For it to be non-delusional, it must be the case that there is a higher power who is continuous with our inner selves.
Second conclusion: There probably is such a power.
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As far as the phrase "sectarian scientist's attitude," James of course was not saying that science itself is sectarian. He believed that in the late 19th century there were those who regarded what THEY understood as science in a quasi-religious manner. He would have named Huxley, Clifford, Taine, Nordau as of their number. What those four names have in common is the sectarian fervor they each attached to what in later generations came to be called reductionism.
Christopher, you're argument was clear enough, although the syllogistic formulation makes it even clearer. The problem I have with the syllogistic formulation is in the new premise, "For it to be non-delusional, it must be the case that there is a higher power who is continuous with our inner selves." Does that premise come from some place other than thin air?
ReplyDeleteApplying my question to your non-syllogistic version of your argument, I would ask how "the sense of a guiding presence, the sense of communication with an Other," is a "route to a God." In other words, how is a psychological feeling an argument for anything other than its own existence? If I feel that I am Napoleon, does that constitute even weak evidence of my being Napoleon? (I do not mean to imply that the sense that James discusses is schizophrenic, as the sense that I am Napoleon would likely be. Nevertheless, it constitutes no more evidence of its cause than hearing the sound of thunder constitutes evidence that Zeus is hurling thunderbolts.
Henry, the New Premise is simply an effort to spell out what it means to be "deluded." I there make explicit something that was implicit in the first/major premise.
ReplyDeleteFor purpose of understanding this argument, we can set aside the issue of the pragmatic conception of truth, on which James is not relying. Let us simply take a disquotational view of truth. 'Snow is white' if and only if snow is what." 'There is a higher being from whom I am receiving a spiritual energy' is true if and only if there is a higher being from whom I am receiving a spiritual energy.'
In my little summary of James' argument, I mean 'deluded' in a sense that includes but rather goes beyond falsehood. My belief that I am Napoleon is deluded. I am not Napoleon. In some rare cases the belief that I am Napoleon might have pragmatic benefits for me. [My pathological depression over my shortness of stature is resolved in the confident knowledge that I have, after all, conquered Europe!]
But much more often, my belief that I am Napoleon will have negative consequences for me. It will cause me to think that horses are still the fastest way to get around. And while I'm looking for my horse, I'll be late for work and get fired, by a boss unimpressed with my imperial robes.
The major premise, then, "Psychological phenomena that are both widely shared and benevolent in their consequences are (probably) not delusional," is the consequence of a confidence in the fundamental rightness of human cognitive equipment. Our equipment, developed at least in part through a process of natural selection (whatever else might have been involved) renders us fit for the world we are in. Thus, the belief that one is living two centuries before one is in fact living and is running an Empire is not a widespread one.
I don't think your real problem is with the New Premise, which as I say is a making-explicit of an element already in the first Major Premise. Is it fair to presume your real difficulty is what that?
Christopher,
ReplyDeleteYes, I accept that my real difficulty is with the first Major Premise, namely that “Psychological phenomena that are both widely shared and benevolent in their consequences are (probably) not delusional.” Even if this statement is true of psychological phenomena generally, it is not an argument that a particular psychological phenomenon that is both widely shared and benevolent in its consequences is not delusional. One particular psychological phenomenon that is both widely shared and benevolent in its consequences is belief in God. (I am assuming that it is benevolent in its consequences to particular believers, as it may help them cope with grief, for example. This is a separate question from whether organized religion is benevolent in its consequences.) Yet belief in God must, in the absence of evidence, be presumed delusional. To claim that the fact that the belief is widely shared and benevolent in its consequences is evidence of the existence of God would be to engage in circular reasoning.
Furthermore, belief in God would have the same benevolent consequences whether or not God exists. The fact that some delusional beliefs, such as that one is Napoleon, may have deleterious consequences is no evidence that other delusional beliefs have deleterious consequences. One must examine the consequences of each belief on its own.
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ReplyDelete"belief in God would have the same benevolent consequences whether or not God exists." That isn't clear to me. That may be the problem.
ReplyDeleteBelief that I'm good at card counting has benevolent consequences only if I'm good at card counting. It isn't merely a matter of increasing confidence. After all, if I'm bad at card counting and head to a table believing otherwise, the confidence my belief gives me is part of the problem, not part of the solution.
How might that be a pertinent example? Consider the fact of subliminal knowledge again. I would not expect that good card counters are always aware of their calculations -- the machinery of awareness would probably slow them down fatally. So much of what they are good at is something that goes on beneath their own ken.
Thus, a successful card counter is someone who has faith in himself, a faith that is in the end verified neither by confidence or good feelings nor by his direct perceptions of what he is doing but by the consequences of his actions at the card table. He either has a mounting pile of chips or he doesn't.
Success at recovering from alcohol also, I would suggest, derives in the first instance from drawing on reserves beneath one's own conscious awareness.
Does a Higher Power help me count cards? Well, if so His favors are selective, as the profitability of the casinos tells us. Still, in addition to all that may be done through study and application, there may well be a "more" even here, in which the continuity of subliminal reserves with a higher power is of the essence of the situation.
There is an obvious difference, I should add, between card counting (even the most successful sort) and recovering from alcohol abuse. One is a zero-sum game in a way that the other is not. No one else has to become increasingly enslaved to an addiction in order for you to become free of it. Yet someone else does have to lose money at cards in order to you to win. Thus, a Higher Power conceived of in most of the plausible sounding ways -- say, as a Fechnerian Earth-Soul -- would be much les interested in the latter than in the former, and likely much less helpful.
ReplyDeleteI agree that "Belief that I'm good at card counting has benevolent consequences only if I'm good at card counting. It isn't merely a matter of increasing confidence." But this is not analogous to belief in God helping one to overcome grief (or addiction, for that matter), because one's confidence that one is good at something is not a factor. At issue is not whether one is good at overcoming grief. In fact, a benevolent consequence of believing in God may have nothing to do with accomplishing anything. Belief in God may merely make one feel better, by, for example, helping one to believe that one's life has meaning, or that a father-figure is looking out for one.
ReplyDeleteSo what does the existence of God have to do with the beneficial consequences of belief in his existence? Nothing that I can see, other than one could believe that the reason that belief in God may help one overcome grief or feel that one’s life has meaning is that God intervenes – that, as a reward for believing in him, God enables one to overcome grief or feel that one’s life has meaning. But that would be an utterly baseless belief. One could equally believe that every success that one has in life, from a ballplayer’s hitting a home run to a lawyer’s winning a case, occurred because God rewarded one for believing in him. One would then have to find an alternative explanation for atheists' successes.
Henry,
ReplyDelete"One would then have to find an alternative explanation for atheists' successes."
Well, that's easy. One may well postulate a God who does not have to be acknowledged to be served, and who rewards service, not acknowledgement. One receives critical spiritual energy in critical moments by the grace of that higher power whom one helps in a way to constitute whether one believe in Him or not.
To make this more concrete, perhaps one would speak as James does in another book, A PLURALISTIC UNIVERSE, not so much of God as of a guardian angel. When we reach down into ourselves we may well be reaching into one another, and into a common subjectivity that on a sufficiently deep level we share, and that subjectivity may well be (this is an "over-belief") the inside of the ecosystem of our planet.
If we demand a God on a cosmic level, then the planet is a small thing, and conceived as having an inside continuous with ourselves, perhaps "guardian angel" is the loftiest title one can assign it. But the the cosmic God becomes a distant being and it is our angel who is our highest power for the purpose of the above argument.
When I read something like this, I feel that the logical positivists of Berlin and Vienna in the 1920s must have been right that only statements logically or empirically verifiable are cognitively meaningful.
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