In yesterday's entry I discussed the idea of substance in early-modern European philosophy, with especial emphasis on Descartes.
I made no criticisms of the views under discussion: simply presented the connections of ideas as I understood and understand them.
Today, I'll make four quick critical observations:
1) The search for what counts as a "substance" seems misguided. Remember, Aristotle used the word roughly as we would use the word "thing." There is no real call for anguished meditation on what counts as a "thing." It depends upon the context in which one uses the word. Indeed, the vagueness of the word adds to, rather than detracts from, its value within a natural language.
2) As everyone knows, Descartes' first solid premise was "I think" and his first inference from that was "I exist." This seems to presume a certain notion of a thinking substance, and to call it "I." If we're going to pursue methodical doubt, we can easily pursue it further than that, dissolving substance along the way. Thinking goes on. There are such things as thoughts. That is true. Some of those thoughts make a collection which might be called "I." But to phrase that fact as "I think" presumes that "I" am a thinking substance, and Descartes is pulling a controversial notion out of a hat by sleight of hand.
3) If we get to "I think therefore I exist" and understand it solipsistically we might end up stuck there. Descartes argument getting himself out of solipsism requires a God who would not deceive him or allow him to be deceive on such a point as the existence of the external world. But since we sometimes are deceived, it is clear that whatever God we might believe exists, does sometimes allow some deceptions. How are we creatures to be sure which deceptions he does and which he doesn't allow?
4) I'm reminded of a man who once said, "I'm a firm solipsist myself and wonder why more people aren't." Don't know why, though.
Regarding your fourth point, you are probably thinking of this:
ReplyDelete“As against solipsism it is to be said, in the first place, that it is psychologically impossible to believe, and is rejected in fact even by those who mean to accept it. I once received a letter from an eminent logician, Mrs. Christine Ladd-Franklin, saying that she was a solipsist, and was surprised that there were no others. Coming from a logician and a solipsist, her surprise surprised me.”
― Bertrand Russell, Human Knowledge Its Scope and Limits
Thanks. I will hereafter refrain from attributing it to a "man," even if I don't specifically retain Ms Ladd-Franklin's name. But your quote makes me wonder. Russell presents this as if Ladd-Franklin was serious and, so, necessarily confused. It seems more likely she was puling his leg, and he was inadequately subtle in his appreciation of this "eminent logician." It would be interesting to see the actual letter, if that survives.
ReplyDeleteI found that quotation by googling and then copied and pasted it from a website. I have now searched the text of the book on amazon.com and offer the following minor corrections. "Ladd Franklin" has no hyphen. (But googling the name reveals that it does, so the error may be Russell's or his typesetter's.) In the final sentence, "her" should be "this." Finally, in the title of the book, a colon should follow "Human Knowledge."
ReplyDeleteThe rest of Russell's paragraph following the quotation criticizes those who carry Cartesian doubt too far. Amazon.com does not allow copying and pasting from texts of books, and I am unwilling to type it myself, but I recommend reading it.