I read the decision in US v. Seeger recently. It was one of those Vietnam era draft-objector cases. It's worth reading and even re-reading, not only for historical interest, but because the Justices gave the impression of a genuine grappling with difficult theological terrain.
The Selective Service Act in effect at the time carved out an exemption for those who conscientiously opposed war out of their "religious training and belief" and it defined "religious" in a way that seemed to entail belief in a Supreme Being. Seeger (1965) marked the emergence of a broader notion of a conscientious objector, one going beyond the usual denominational suspects.
http://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/380/163/
One of the draft resisters involved in this case had explained to his draft board that he believed there was "some power manifest in nature" which he was obeying by refusing to go to war. They could if they wanted "call that a belief in the Supreme Being or God. Those just do not happen to be the words I use."
The Supreme Court said, in effect, that he didn't have to use such words.
I appreciate their invocation of the theologian Paul Tillich, who wrote: "The source of this affirmation of meaning within meaninglessness, of certitude within doubt, is not the God of traditional theism, but the 'God above God.' the power of being, which works through those who have no name for it, not even the name God."
Exemptions from laws based on religious beliefs—whether of the traditional variety or the Seeger variety—at the same time go too far and not far enough. The First Amendment opens, “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” These two clauses—the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause— conflict when the government gives an exemption based on religious beliefs. This is because an “establishment” of religion includes a governmental benefit to religion, and that is what an exemption is. No religion is entitled to an exemption; if it were, then the government could not apply the law against murder to religions that believe in human sacrifices.
ReplyDeleteThus, the law goes too far when it grants any exemptions based on religious belief. Such exemptions constitute a gift to religion, contrary, at least to the spirit of the Establishment Clause. And, in so favoring religion, such exemptions don’t go far enough. Suppose that I oppose a war not because of my religious beliefs, but because I think that the particular war is immoral—that my country unjustifiably invaded another country. Wouldn’t my reasoned decision be more worthy of respect than a belief that every war is wrong, regardless of the basis of the belief or the consequences of not fighting the war (Hitler’s taking over Europe, for example)? A religious opposition to war, after all, may have no more basis than that my parents raised me in a particular religion and did so because their parents raised them in that religion, and so forth. Thus, if the government is going to give the gift of an exemption, it should not do so on the basis of a person’s religious beliefs.