Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, the fellow portrayed here, is the author of MORAL SKEPTICISMS. This is not to be confused with an anthology called MORAL SKEPTICISM (singular), edited by Diego Machuca, which I included recently on my list of a dozen forthcoming books on epistemology. Actually, I confused the two myself, and am now re-writing this entry to straighten that out. I'm happy to report that Sinnott-Armstrong, at least, is not a moral skeptic. Happy because, as I trust my readers know, I am a cognitivist in meta-ethics and moral epistemology. I very much believe there is a fact of the matter that one either hits or one misses when one says, for example, "it would be right to switch the track on that trolley." Further, I see cognitivism as central to my Jamesianism, and thus to the mission of this humble blog. So I'm happy to see that Sinnott-Armstrong is an ally on this matter, and that his book is about moral skepticism, not for it. Sinnott-Armstrong i...