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A 2013 anthology, PHILOSOPHY OF PSEUDOSCIENCE, contends that Karl Popper was in essence right on his crucial contentions over falsifiability and science.

Here's a link. 

Specifically, Popper contended first that it is important (as a task within the broad domain of epistemology) for philosophers to distinguish between what is science and what isn't; second that what is science must be in principle falsifiable; third that the falsifiability is linked to the good reasons why sciences are prestigious activities -- the reasons why the word 'science' is worth co-opting.

Those views have gone out of fashion, for a lot of reasons. Susan Haack, for example, argues that the "demarcation problem" is of little significance. Philosophers should stop arguing over what deserves the label "science," in part because she believes falsifiability is also good as a rough guide to valuable thought in a lot of fields of scholarship one wouldn't want to put on the "science" side of such a line.

That is precisely the contemporary suspicion that it is the point of this book to counter. The authors agree that science is not all of knowledge, but it is a very important human project, and its prestige is earned. Thus, demarcating science from non-science, and especially from non-science pretending to be science, is an important endeavor. Further, though Popper was himself open to critique in detail, there is as one of the authors represented here puts it "something profoundly right about the contrasts he sets up...."


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