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Determinism and the Tearfulness of Things

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Yes, I understand that introducing "quantum theory" into a discussion of the foundations of morals
is over-done. It has become associated with New Age fishiness. I will go there, regardless.

Suppose a certain swindler has stolen money that properly belonged to a worthy charity, and
“Made Off” with it. His theft might have rendered the charity helpless to do some good works on
which helpless beneficiaries of its attentions had come to rely. This event must be for us (if we
are deterministic) something more than a one-time bad event or evil action. It must be a baked-in
feature of the universe. The laws of nature demanded mercilessly and without recourse that the swindler
had to swindle, the charity had to be rendered impotent, the helpless had to suffer.  Without any other
‘could have been’ this tragedy before a part of an irremediable tearfulness of things.   


If, imbued with healthy animal spirits we seek to escape that pessimism about the whole of things, and
if we remain true to determinism, we will be tempted to do so by means of subjectivism. We can do so,
then, by rejecting the notion that the swindle was a bad thing, or the work of the charity was a
good thing. It is only my perception of them, such a subjectivist can tell himself, that makes either of
them anything at all.


One is reminded of an old story of three baseball umpires discussing their craft. The first says, “ I call
‘em as I see them.” The second, “I call them as they are.” The third, “They ain’t nothing until I call them.”


Given the background of determinism, the first two umpires seem to have decided that the whole game
is rigged -- that the whole of the universe is one big spitball. But the third umpire escapes from this
by taking refuge in his own subjectivity. Presumably since the whole of the universe deterministically
produced that subjectivity, it has something to be said for it, after all.

It isn’t wrong to be delighted that science allows for a philosophy that isn’t as pessimistic as are the
first two of those umpires, and that isn’t so self-besotted as is the third. Contemporary science, and
philosophy working from science, allows us with a good conscious to believe that there are alternative
“maybes,” and this allows us in turn to believe that a swindler’s actions are isolated wrong acts, that
they do not require that we indict the whole nature of things.  

Comments

  1. This posting is over my head, but I can say that the three umpires' statements are consistent with one another. They all accurately describe the same reality. Every pitch is either a ball or a strike (that is, it was either within the strike zone or it was not) before the umpire calls it. The third umpire, therefore, is saying no more than that a pitch isn't called a ball or a strike until he calls it one or the other. He's not saying that the pitch was neither within nor without the strike zone until he calls it.

    As for the first and second umpires, the convention in baseball is not to determine scientifically, with multiple cameras shooting from different angles, whether a pitch is a ball or a strike, but to rely upon the umpire's perception of it. Therefore, when the second umpire says, "I call them as they are," he is really saying, "I call 'em as they appear to me to be." And, when the first umpire says, "I call 'em as I see them," he is, like the second umpire, saying, "I call 'em as they appear to me to be." Both strive to be objective but both presumably recognize that a set of multiple cameras might show their call to be wrong. Yet, like the Supreme Court's, their word is final.

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