In 2008, Acta Analytica, which describes itself as an "international periodical for philosophy in the analytical tradition" ran a piece by Hilla Jacobson-Horowitz and Amir Horowitz called "Conceivability, Higher Order Patterns, and Physicalism."
It is a contribution to the philosophy of the mind that argues that physicalism (roughly what used to be called "materialism") is a coherent plausible view and survives the so-called zombie argument.
So ... what's the zombie argument?
It is roughly this:
1. Physicalism suggests that the phenomenal properties of mind (the specific sensation of "seeing blue" and knowing that one sees blue for example) are fully necessitated and determined by the physical properties of the body, especially of the brain.
2. The "zombies" we are asked to imagine are beings in every other respect like ourselves, every material/physical respect, yet who lack these phenomenal properties. Their bodies may respond in certain ways to the wave-lengths of light that we call blue hitting their eyes, but they would NOT have the phenomenal (internal) experience of seeing blue.
3. Since we can imagine (2) without contradiction, the existence of such beings is conceivable.
4. Yet we know we are NOT such beings, in much the same way Descartes knew that he thought and existed.
5. If both types of being are possible, then something important escapes physicalism. So the suggestion stated in (1) is false, and so is physicalism.
The authors found this argument unpersuasive.
They criticize the underlying idea of conceivability, that is, of validating a hypothesis in some pertinent degree simply by imagining that it might be so. If this is to be at all plausible, say the authors, it must be understood to mean conceivable "upon ideal rational reflection" rather than simply "on first appearance."
Yet the physicalist can simply deny that zombies would survive ideal rational reflection, and it is hard to see how the proponents of the argument can make it work without presuming their conclusion.
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