Mario de Caro and Matteo Grasso together wrote "Three Views of Downward Causation" for publication
in the 2017 anthology,
"Philosophical and scientific perspectives on downward causation." Nothing much to do with the
Koestler book, but I like that cover image.
The issue of "downward causation" is one that arises in the philosophy
of mind, among those who believe that mind and body, even mind and brain,
are different facts in the world, neither reducible to the other.
The issue of downward causation is: how if at all can mental events
cause physical events? How does my phenomenal desire that my arm move
lead to my arm moving?
De Caro and Grasso contend that naturalism is consistent with the reality
of downward causation. We do not have to postulate any non-natural
facts, souls, trans-empirical egos, a ghost in the machine, etc., in order to acknowledge that the
desire is a non-physical fact and that it CAUSES the arm movement.
They offer three possible explanations of how: anomalous monism,
ontological emergentism, and intentional causation. My readers will by
now remember that I have set out my own emergentist views here, at least
in broad outline. But De Caro and Grasso think intentional causation
is the best of the three candidates. What they mean by this door number
three is the idea that explanation and causation are mutually exclusive
and irreducible goals, and that intention can be part of the cause-and-effect
chain even if we learn how to omit it from any explanation.
It sounds like word-shuffling to me. No real help at all. But consider
this simply a bibliographic note.
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