There are many tech ideas that are always on the horizon, never actually here. Personal air travel (formerly known as "flying cars"), quantum computing, fusion energy, the commercial use of superconductivity.
Another item for this list is surely "small nuclear reactors". Even in the heyday of the nuke/anti-nuke debates, after Three Mile Island, there was a theory on the pro-nuke side that the real problem was the endless delay that comes with bigness. Smaller ("modular") reactors could mean less expensive projects, a quicker licensing cycle, more expeditious actual building, and the gradual popular acceptance that would come with familiarity.
"Okay, in my back yard, because it seems to be in just about everybody's back yard." That's the idea.
More recently, the growing concern over climate change as THE great environmental issue, and on the burning of hydrocarbons as the great controllable cause there of, the politics of nuclear power has changed. It is no longer a left/right thing. Climate change deniers shout "drill baby drill" and may be averse to nuclear power as an alternative to all of their beloved drilling. Climate change activists, whose heroes amongst the old folks may have been anti-nuke protesters back in the day, may see nuclear power as part of the way forward, or at least part of a transition to a no-carbon system.
This political shift has brought renewed attention to the technological shift toward smaller scale reactors. But ... why aren't they on the scene already?
The IAEA says that work is underway, or investment is on the table, in at least twenty-five countries toward the end of modular nuclear energy. In some energy-intensive industries, such as steel production, it seems to make sense to bring the nuke "in house," under the corporate roof of the steel company, rather than dealing with the broader utility/grid.
But the modular nukes do not yet exist. NuScale Power, an Oregon based company founded in 2000, seemed to have the inside track. For a time, it was using the year 2024 as the date on which it would actually start making deliveries of the devices, which were to be capable of generating 460 MW of electrical power per hour. They would have made this first delivery to the Utah Associated Municipal Power Systems. It didn't and won't happen. The estimated costs kept going up, and UAMPS tolerance for the increases reached a ceiling. The project was cancelled last year.
That sequence of events has happened a lot -- early on the numbers are low, the turn-around time is said to be quick. The former increase quickly and the latter gets stretched out. Of course, over-promising is not unique to the nuclear industry. But in this case the over-promising may seem reasonable because there is so little industry experience to go on. If I'm going to give you a fair guess as to how soon I can get the widget to your door and what I'll have to charge you for it, I will presumably look at comparable widget projects so I canmake defensible guesstimates.
In this case, though, there is virtually no comparable widget history.
The problem is a frustratingly circular one, true. There can't be a history for comparisons until deliveries get made. Deliveries are getting made because the customers can't count on the guesstimates. Which is true because there is no history for comparisons. Usually high-risk early adopters help a new development blow through such a circle. This time? Well ... the UAMPS' of the world aren't feeling that frisky.
So ... don't hold your breath on this one.
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