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Harre and Prinz on Loneliness



In 1986 a fellow named Rom Harre wrote a defense of the "social constructivist" view of emotions and discussed loneliness in this connection. Loneliness, in his view, has no somatic component, it is a cognitive emotion, and thus illustrates how emotions are relative to the society in which the individual lives and breathes (and, in this case, sighs) and has his being.
 
Prinz, in the book I've discussed here before, replies that, first, he isn't sure loneliness should be classified as an emotion at all. It may be a mood, which he treats as subtly different. But he doesn't seem sure of that point, so for the sake of argument he  regards it as an emotion.
 
Second, though, it isn't necessarily the case that it lacks physical symptoms. "It is hard to imagine feeling lonely while one's heart is racing, for example." 
 
Third, and cutting to the heart of Harre's point, we don't have any good reason to believe that we need cognition to feel lonely. Just as a thoughtexperiment, we can with consistency imagine discovering that loneliness is a primitive response triggered by the pheromone system. "When we do not detect pheromones of other people for a period of time" on this hypothesis, "then we enter a somatic state akin to sadness."
 
On this or some similar hypothesis, it is of course possible that "thoughts of isolation" (a cognition of one's social situation) enter the picture too. But they would be neither necessary nor sufficient for loneliness.

This isn't to say that Prinz sees nothing of value in constructivism. He sees his own view of emotions as reconciling the respective roles of nature and nurture. But he doesn't want constructivism in any form that requires that thoughts be inherent in emotions.

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