More on the Argument from Design

Last week I wrote an entry about the "argument from design," and William James' negative view of it.

This week, prompted by a commenter there, I'll add some thoughts.

Close up of a clockwork Stock Photo - 9118127

I quoted James writing thus: "When one views the world with no definite theological bias one way or the other, one sees that order and disorder, as we now recognize them, are purely human inventions. We are interested in certain types of arrangement ... so interested that whenever we find them realized, the fact emphatically rivets our attention. The result is that we work over the contents of the world selectively."

Henry objected. He saw two arguments here, one on the assumption that order is an objective fact, the other on the denial of that assumption.

1) Assuming order is an objective fact, it is equally so that there is a lot of disorder too, which vitiates the proposed inference that there is an order-loving Creator.

2) But order isn't an objective fact, it is subjective, an invention of the human mind, and so again proves nothing about a supposed Creator.

Henry, seeing James' passage in this way, thought it unpersuasive. Although disorder poses a problem for certain conceptions of a God (an unqualifiedly order loving and omnipotent God) it isn't difficult to relax one or both of those assumptions and contend that the order that there is requires an intelligent being responsible for it.

As to the second point, Henry sees it simply as false. Order is a name for such objective facts as that the planets circle the sun on a regular path.

I see James as making one point here, not two, and the one is quite cogent. By way of review, consider that the 'argument from design' requires two steps. From order to design. Then from design to designer. Then as a first-order appraisal, ask yourself why we see order as the point needing explanation. Is some perfect state of disorder then a default universe? If so: why?

Note that the issue here is not the "first cause" argument or any variant. We aren't asking why any universe exists. That's another argument (addressed by James separately). The argument from design asks why this particular universe, one showing as much order as it does, is the one that exist.

So it is an appropriate riposte to say: given that some universe exists, why should it not be this one? Why should it not be a universe that combines order with disorder: some regular-looking solar systems and some rocks hurtling into them on very eccentric paths or from deepest space? Is some other sort of universe a background assumption whence this one departs?

It is the orderly aspect, as we humans define it, that "emphatically rivets our attention," and this gives the argument from design its spurious plausibility.

James also writes, explaining the matter further: "If I should throw down a thousand beans at random upon a table, I could doubtless, by eliminating a sufficient number of them, leave the rest in almost any geometrical pattern you might propose to me, and you might then say that that pattern was the thing prefigured beforehand, and that the other beans were mere irrelevance and packing material."

Surely the God in whom we are asked to believe, by those who propose the teleological argument, is not a God who has merely thrown beans onto a table at random.

I believe I've said enough to vindicate James' point against Henry's objections. I'll say a few words tomorrow about where this fits within the broader scheme of Jamesian thought.

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Jamesian Philosophy Refreshed

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