I'm sure I've mentioned in earlier posts the notorious Bernie Madoff, who ran Bernard L.
Madoff Investment Securities LLC from the day he started it up in 1960 until
the day he surrendered to authorities in December 2008.
Madoff’s crime, in common parlance,
is that he was running a “Ponzi scheme.” This is a fraud in which early
depositors are told their money has been invested in some wonderfully
productive/reliable way, and they are receiving a share of the profits, when in fact what they are receiving are phony paper
returns, from the deposits
of other suckers.
In Madoff’s case, the Ponzi scheme
seems to have been adopted in a very cold-blooded way and operated for decades
before it finally became unsustainable.
I mention him here because I've been giving some thought to the fact that sometimes the development of a Ponzi scheme is not quite so
cold-blooded. Sometimes an asset manager will bumble into running a Ponzi
scheme by degrees. [I am not, by the way, offering this as an excuse or even as
a mitigation of the offense. It is fraudulent wherever it happens. I make the
comment as an empirical observation about criminal psychology.]
Samuel Israel III, one of the
principals of Bayou, (pictured above, inhabiting the planet) was from an old Louisiana family that had long been
successful in the trading associated with the port of New Orleans. Although Sam
the Third wanted to make his fortune in the hedge fund world around New York,
he seems to have retained his faith that some gene-based trading prowess inherited
from earlier Israels would help him through. And the fund’s name, “Bayou,”
speaks of this faith.
But trading prowess appears not to
be gene-based. Within two years after the firm got its start in 1996, it was
clear that the results would disappoint investors, and would not inspired new
arrivals. Thus, Israel and the others started faking the numbers at the end of
1998.
Such fakery, once indulged at all,
becomes a very slippery and very steep slope. One might fudge the numbers
slightly in one quarter in the hope/expectation that one’s earnings the next
quarter will be sufficient to make it all good so nobody will ever notice, telling
one’s self it’s a harmless bit of borrowing from a piggy bank. But if the next
quarter itself is disappointing as well then the fudging has to get larger, and
the since by this time the trading came reek of desperation the likelihood of
ever getting the big legitimate wins that will allow one to feed the looted
piggy banks drops precipitously.
But 2004 there was no actual trading
underway at Bayou at all anymore. What remained was only a Ponzi scheme,
inadvertently created. In 2005 the pretense fell apart.
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