Colin McGinn, a contemporary philosopher of some importance, (google "new mysterians") often discusses the history of the discipline in his blog. I'm fascinated by his recent comment on "Wittgenstein's Ontology," which you can find by clicking here. Wittgenstein’s Ontology - Colin McGinn
Let us start our consideration of it with a simple question: what is ontology? By standard definition, it is the study of being, discussing for example what types of thing constitute the furniture of the universe. Sample questions: Are numbers real? Are only the numbers we call "real numbers" real or are "imaginary" numbers also real? This is distinct from questions about cosmology or the mind-body problem, which are puzzles ABOUT certain of the pieces of furniture in the universe. These inquiries all fit under the broader framework of metaphysics.
Anyway, McGinn's first point is that Wittgenstein sets out his own ontology clearly in the opening words of his TRACTATUS. The world is everything that is the case. So what "is the case" is the furniture. What is the case is not an object, but a fact.
The TRACTATUS appeared in 1922, just a little over one century ago. It is often contrasted with a later text of his, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS, left in manuscript form at his death in 1951. The two writings are said to reflect "early" and "later" Wittgenstein, with the former fitting well into the analytic/positivist tradition, and the latter (at a minimum) pressing against that envelope.
McGinn doesn't gainsay that assessment. But he does make the point that Wittgenstein need not have changed his ontology in order to write INVESTIGATIONS.
"No reader could hazard a guess as to Wittgenstein's ontology" looking at the INVESTIGATIONS alone. "Certainly, no consequences for meaning are derived from a presumed ontology."
So what CAN we say about what did and did not change in LW's thought? That is a big question....
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