Another term of the U.S. Supreme Court has come and gone.
This year as in most years the court has issued a lot of decisions that are, in their own several
ways, fascinating. One will be remembered in the history books as THE decision
of this term, and it also plays into a number of my own web of obsessions. That
would be NFIB v. Sebelius, also known
as “the Obamacare decision.” But I’ll put off my own discussion of that one
until next week. Today, I’ll do a round-up of five others of this term’s cases,
ordered by the date of decision.
I will also leave out of discussion an important patent law
decision from this term, because I have had something to say of that one here.
This leaves the following decisions as of great importance:
Filarsky v. Delia (April 17) –This is an unfortunate case
in which the court gave municipal immunity to a private attorney with whom
the municipality contracted for a specific investigation.
Generally speaking, municipalities and their employees have a "qualified immunity" from tort liabilities. The point of this immunity is that it supposedly does some harm to allow for lawsuits that would render government officials too timorous in their performance of their duties, or that would cause individuals to avoid taking on public service at all.
In this case, the city of Rialto, California demoted a firefighter for sending racially derogatory and pornographic emails. After that, the demoted firefighter began taking lengthy absences from work allegedly due to sickness. Somebody amongst Rialto's wise heads suspected that the firefighter was actually taking time off because he was angry over the demotion, that the illnesses were pretextual. So, they opened an internal investigation, and contracted with Filarsky for related legal advice.
Skipping forward a bit ... the firefighter filed a lawsuit against the city, its fire department, and various individuals (including Filarsky) alleging under section 1983 tortious violations of his constitutional rights under the 4th amendment in the course of this investigation.
My own humble view: immunities from lawsuits tend to divide people into two groups -- an immune elite and the non-immune peasantry. Any extension of the scope of such immunities worsens the divide. Thus, I have to regard this decision as a bad thing.
Generally speaking, municipalities and their employees have a "qualified immunity" from tort liabilities. The point of this immunity is that it supposedly does some harm to allow for lawsuits that would render government officials too timorous in their performance of their duties, or that would cause individuals to avoid taking on public service at all.
In this case, the city of Rialto, California demoted a firefighter for sending racially derogatory and pornographic emails. After that, the demoted firefighter began taking lengthy absences from work allegedly due to sickness. Somebody amongst Rialto's wise heads suspected that the firefighter was actually taking time off because he was angry over the demotion, that the illnesses were pretextual. So, they opened an internal investigation, and contracted with Filarsky for related legal advice.
Skipping forward a bit ... the firefighter filed a lawsuit against the city, its fire department, and various individuals (including Filarsky) alleging under section 1983 tortious violations of his constitutional rights under the 4th amendment in the course of this investigation.
My own humble view: immunities from lawsuits tend to divide people into two groups -- an immune elite and the non-immune peasantry. Any extension of the scope of such immunities worsens the divide. Thus, I have to regard this decision as a bad thing.
RadLAX Gateway v. Amalgamated Bank (May 29) -- bankruptcy law.
Distressed-assets investors, those brave souls who take interests in the assets of comapnies in, or likely about to enter, bankruptcy can relax a bit after two appellate courts gave them a scare. The US Supreme Court has affirmed the right of secured creditors to “credit bid,” in other words to offer back to the debtor what they are owed rather than a cash payment, at an asset auction.
The possibility of such credit bids protects the creditors, often the purchaser of the distressed assets who has stepped into the shoes of an earlier and less bold creditor, against the threat that their collateral will be sold at a depressed price. This is a sensible safeguard, and key parts of corporate bankruptcy law in the U.S. were written by drafters with such a thought in mind. Unfortunately, a hyper-literalist reading by two appellate courts put that safeguard in jeopardy.
Distressed-assets investors, those brave souls who take interests in the assets of comapnies in, or likely about to enter, bankruptcy can relax a bit after two appellate courts gave them a scare. The US Supreme Court has affirmed the right of secured creditors to “credit bid,” in other words to offer back to the debtor what they are owed rather than a cash payment, at an asset auction.
The possibility of such credit bids protects the creditors, often the purchaser of the distressed assets who has stepped into the shoes of an earlier and less bold creditor, against the threat that their collateral will be sold at a depressed price. This is a sensible safeguard, and key parts of corporate bankruptcy law in the U.S. were written by drafters with such a thought in mind. Unfortunately, a hyper-literalist reading by two appellate courts put that safeguard in jeopardy.
Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham (June 18) – functional definition
of salesmen
The Supreme Court has now held that "detailers," the quasi-salesmen who go from one doctor's office to
another, street to street, persuading doctors to prescribe their company's new
drugs for patients, are at law "sales people."
This is so even though the detailers don't literally make
sales. At most they get a non-binding commitment from the doctors to prescribe.
There isn't actually a sale until the customer/patient and/or his insurer forks
over money at a drug store counter somewhere. Still, the detailers are functionally salesmen, and this makes a huge difference in terms of Labor Dept. regulations. It means the drug companies aren't on the hook for billions in overtime pay.
More generally, I approve of functional definitions of key terms. They help make the world of capitalist acts between consensual adults run smoothly.
Arizona v. United States (June 25) – supremacy clause and
preemption
Notice that I'm not calling this an "immigration law" case. It is a straightforward application of the constitution's supremacy clause. So much so that I'll say no more -- its importance is not matched by intricacy.
Notice that I'm not calling this an "immigration law" case. It is a straightforward application of the constitution's supremacy clause. So much so that I'll say no more -- its importance is not matched by intricacy.
United States v. Alvarez (June 28) – a victory for free speech
Yes, it is rather slimy when someone, especially a politician, claims to have earned a medal he did not in fact earn. But ... the first amendment does not say "Congress shall pass no law abridging the freedom of truthful speech" or "the freedom of speech by people who aren't slimebags." The framers deliberately made it rather broad. No law abridging the freedom of speech.
I can give the court a fairly good grade for this term. It
was on the right side in four out of the five of these cases, which I selected
(you’ll have to take my word for this without any thought to whether they’d
make the court seem good or bad.
Yes, it is rather slimy when someone, especially a politician, claims to have earned a medal he did not in fact earn. But ... the first amendment does not say "Congress shall pass no law abridging the freedom of truthful speech" or "the freedom of speech by people who aren't slimebags." The framers deliberately made it rather broad. No law abridging the freedom of speech.
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