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What is the "State"?

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Max Weber famously defined the State as the institution of a human community "that (successfully) lays claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical violence within a given territory."

That definition had been very useful to anarchists, including anarcho-caps, as it has given us a nice definition of what we are saying we are against when we say we are against the State.

The definition raises certain immediate questions. For Americans, accustomed to arguments over the "state" (in the historically specific sense) and the federal government, the question naturally arises whether a state can agree to share its 'monopoly.' Should we define terms so that both Virginia and the USA have some say in deciding what is a legitimate use of violence in downtown Richmond? Is that a duopoly in one sense but still a monopoly in another?

Then there is the word "legitimate." The context indicates that Weber sees that state as self-defining in this sense. The state decides what use of violence is legitimate, and the state gives itself a monopoly thereon. Yes, an individual can act violently in self defense and in most states that will be a defense (in the state's courts) to a criminal charge relating to that violence (brought by the state's prosecutors). But in Weber's understanding the state isn't recognizing anything natural or God given here, it is in effect licensing people to act as its deputy when they are attacked. That is why a Weberian will not see acts of self defense as infringing on the postulated monopoly.

The word "legitimate" in its hard-headed Weberian realist sense need not refer to the consent of the governed or to an agreement within the international community as to who is a proper member thereof. Even the implication that there ought to be some agreement about legitimacy with the neighboring states as to the borders is a muted one, offered in those final four words of the definition.

In some sense a state's effort to establish and maintain its monopoly is only "successful" within the border areas when there is some agreement with the neighbors about the line and border issue protocol. So some international component will sneak in for anyone seeking some depth of understanding into Weber's conception. But it is as minimal a component as he can make it.

It is precisely the hardness of Weber's head, the absence of sentimentality about such matters, that makes his definition of great analytical value. He is -- if I may be allowed a Trekker allusion -- the  Vulcan of political science.

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