As we discussed yesterday: a child will begin working with a concept of dog with only one data point: Fido. Nobody waits, or should wait, for enough material to build up a table of similarities and contrasts. The building of assumptions and experimentation begins immediately. Meeting the neighbors' dog is simply an early experiment in one's life. The neighbors' dog may be much larger than our own family dog: I may have to revise my view that dogs fit naturally on human laps, like Fido. Ah, but what does that have to do with us? One might ask. "There are only adults in this room." Still: there are matters on which we have only one datum. Consider life on Earth. We know as of yet of only one planet that hosts life. We have hypotheses about others, and a huge body of fiction on the subject. But we have no reliable information about any other such planet. This is NOT an example of Dewey's. [He was writing How we think only a few years after the H.G. Well
I discussed in two earlier posts the broad argument of John Dewey's book, HOW WE THINK, introducing a philosophical foundation for a theory of education in which schools have the goal of teaching how to think critically. This week I would like to focus three posts on a single important, though rather dry, issue within that book. What are concepts and how are THEY formed? According to Dewey, a conception is simply "a definite meaning which is standardized." As Dewey would have known, William James once offered a two-word statement of the same point, "thingumbob again". How do we acquire these standardized meanings? Most especially: how do we acquire concepts that may be considered somewhat abstract, where for example the standardized meaning allows for variation? Dewey offers a nice run-down of the standard account here before offering his own. The standard account (one may call it Baconian) is that a child begins with a lot of different particular things.