Jamesian Philosophy Refreshed

Looking into and around the passage discussed with reader Henry in the comments section of this blog Dec. 20th.  On the page preceding that quote, Russell had written: "[W]e have to choose between two alternatives. Either we must accept skeptical solipsism in its most rigorous form, or we must admit that we know, independently of experience, some principle or principles by means of which it is possible to infer events from other events, at least with probability. If we adopt the first alternative we must reject far more than solipsism is ordinarily thought to reject; we cannot know of the existence of our own past or future, or have any ground for expectations as to our own future, if it occurs. If we adopt the second alternative, we must partially reject empiricism; we must admit that we have knowledge as to certain general features of the course of nature [that] cannot be logically inferred from experience." Worth mulling over. I submit that we can keep empi...

In yesterday's entry I discussed the idea of substance in early-modern European philosophy, with especial emphasis on Descartes. I made no criticisms of the views under discussion: simply presented the connections of ideas as I understood and understand them. Today, I'll make four quick critical observations: 1)  The search for what counts as a "substance" seems misguided. Remember, Aristotle used the word roughly as we would use the word "thing." There is no real call for anguished meditation on what counts as a "thing." It depends upon the context in which one uses the word. Indeed, the vagueness of the word adds to, rather than detracts from, its value within a natural language. 2) As everyone knows, Descartes' first solid premise was "I think" and his first inference from that was "I exist." This seems to presume a certain notion of a thinking substance, and to call it "I." If we're going to pursu...