Jamesian Philosophy Refreshed

Dan Zahavi resumes an old debate about whether the human self discloses itself in thought -- whether I know myself (and so can be sure of my own existence) because of cogito. In its origin, this argument is Descartes vs Hume. In more recent decades, Jesse Prinz (portrayed above) has argued that there is no "experiential quality" that discloses self to self, BUT that consciousness is thoroughly permeated by selfhood. If I understand Prinz, he means that we know our self by a sort of inference, not as directly as Descartes'  concise language suggests but more genuinely that Hume's bundle theory can accommodate. Zahavi says that Prinz has rediscovered an element in Kantianism. As Kant put it, "I cannot cognize as an object itself that which I must presuppose in order to cognize an object at all." Zahavi's own view is that self-consciousness, the sort of conscious event that reveals a self, is a particular sort of event, not any-old event and not t...

In a 1994 essay, Alan Gewirth (pictured here) admitted that Kant's argument to the categorical imperative had flaws, and he attempted a patch-up job. In a 2007 book, another philosopher Jesse Prinz, reconstructed Gewirth's reconstruction of what Kant might have meant. In Prinz' version it has an economical two premises, everything else is a conclusion.  I present the Prinz version without further comment, except for one bracketed correction. P1. I am an agent. P2. If I am an agent, I accept that freedom and well-being are necessary for me. C1. Therefore, I accept that I must have freedom and well-being. (From P1 and P2.) C2. Therefore, I accept that it is impermissible to not have freedom and well-being. (From C1, because its denial is the contradiction of that premise.) C3. Therefore, I accept that it is impermissible for others to remove or interfere with my freedom and well-being. (From C2.) C4. Therefore, I accept that others ought to refrain f...

In response to a question in Yahoo!Answers that seems to be from a newcomer to philosophy, I suggested the following books. "If you're looking to get your feet wet, I suggest a classic by Will Durant, THE STORY OF PHILOSOPHY (1924). "When you're ready to go a little deeper, and incorporate in your thinking some philosophers whose work is more recent than Durant's survey, I suggest Roger Scruton, MODERN PHILOSOPHY (1994). "Then leap right in! Some quite recent books of worth include: Jesse J. Prinz, GUT REACTIONS (2006) ; Robert Kane, A CONTEMPORARY INTRODUCTION TO FREE WILL (2005); Doug Erlandson, THE THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE (2013). Enjoy the struggle." I ended it that way because philosophy when engaged properly is a struggle. If you don't feel yourself to be torn in multiple directions by good arguments all around -- you're doing it wrong. Yet this struggle, like many struggles, contains its own variety of enjoyment.

In 1986 a fellow named Rom Harre wrote a defense of the "social constructivist" view of emotions and discussed loneliness in this connection. Loneliness, in his view, has no somatic component, it is a cognitive emotion, and thus illustrates how emotions are relative to the society in which the individual lives and breathes (and, in this case, sighs) and has his being.   Prinz, in the book I've discussed here before,  replies that, first, he isn't sure loneliness should be classified as an emotion at all. It may be a mood , which he treats as subtly different. But he doesn't seem sure of that point, so for the sake of argument he  regards it as an emotion.   Second, though, it isn't necessarily the case that it lacks physical symptoms. "It is hard to imagine feeling lonely while one's heart is racing, for example."    Third, and cutting to the heart of Harre's point, we don't have any good reason to believe that we need co...

I've written before here (as on September 27th) about Jesse Prinz' recent book on the emotions, a book in which he advocates and in the process somewhat revises the James-Lange theory. Today I'd like to quote a bit of what he has to say about romantic love, drawing on a classic work by C.S. Lewis (who is pictured above). "To contrast the constructivist approach with evolutionary psychology, it is instructive to ... reconsider romantic love. Some constructionists have endorsed C.S. Lewis' (1936) provocative thesis that romantic love was invented in medieval France....Apparently, during the twelfth century it became very fashionable for Frenchmen to become infatuated with married women of higher social station....It is hard to know which is more cynical [selfish-gene] reductionism or constructionism. On the former, love is an evolutionary insurance policy, and on the latter, it is a French fad that happened to stick." Prinz doesn't advocate either of...

Recently I made the comment that I found the James-Lange theory of emotions very wise. Henry followed up, asking whether I was aware of contemporary work that supported that 1880s-era view. I said "yes," and offered this link: Luca Barlassina . That's an article published just this year by Dr. Barlassina, a scholar affiliated with Ruhr-Universitat Bochum's Center for Mind, Brain, and Cognitive Evolution, written with the assistance of  Dr. Albert Newen, who has a chair at the same Center. Barlassina and Newen (B&N) title their paper "The Role of Bodily Perception in Emotion: In Defense of an Impure Somatic Theory." Some definition of terms is then in order. A "somatic theory" is one that says that the body [that is, to avoid triviality, the set of non-brain portions of the body] plays a critical role in causing emotions (not just in expressing them). B&N explicitly cite James as an early theorist of this sort and they add ano...