In 2008, Acta Analytica, which describes itself as an "international periodical for philosophy in the analytical tradition" ran a piece by Hilla Jacobson-Horowitz and Amir Horowitz called "Conceivability, Higher Order Patterns, and Physicalism." It is a contribution to the philosophy of the mind that argues that physicalism (roughly what used to be called "materialism") is a coherent plausible view and survives the so-called zombie argument. So ... what's the zombie argument? It is roughly this: 1. Physicalism suggests that the phenomenal properties of mind (the specific sensation of "seeing blue" and knowing that one sees blue for example) are fully necessitated and determined by the physical properties of the body, especially of the brain. 2. The "zombies" we are asked to imagine are beings in every other respect like ourselves, every material/physical respect, yet who lack these phenomenal properties. Their bodies ma...
