List criticizes the "causal exclusion" argument, which is a recent formulation of the case for epiphenomenalism in mind-body relations. By usual definition,"epiphenomenalism" is the view that though there is an intangible mind distinct from the body (there are such things as "intentions" for example, which may not be reducible to any physical sort of fact), this mind, these intentions DO NO WORK. They do not function as causes, just as the steam coming out of a train does nothing to move the train. The causal exclusion argument works from two premises: 1) the premise of the causal closure of the world. Any physically realized event has a sufficient physical cause. 2) the premise of causal exclusion. If an event has a sufficient cause, then it has no other distinct cause at the same time. I'm standing outside on the street and a cab comes by. I raise my arm in a familiar gesture. Why did I raise my arm? The first premise tells me that there ...