I only quite recently learned a new philosophical word, "inferentialism". It is the view, especially associated with Robert Brandom, that a concept derives its meaning from its use in a network of inferences, and that accordingly a word or expression has its meaning only because and when users can employ it within such a network. This is a contention within the philosophy of language that has consequences in philosophy of mind and epistemology. That is Brandom above, with a parrot. A creature that can use lots of words ad phases but has no real skill at inference. If you tell your parrot "it is raining today," he may or may not pick it up and say back to you "it is raining today." He will surely not say, "so you better be careful when you go for a drive tomorrow on those wet roads." Importantly, this is a non-representational theory. The phrase "it is raining" does not derive its meaning from the drops of hydrogen bonded with ox...
To my mind, one of the most intriguing of the ancient Greek philosophers is the second of the great Eleatics, Zeno of Elea. But ... does he still matter? C ome, let us reason together. If the fastest of warriors, Achilles, can not catch up with a tortoise, then something is of course very wrong with the way we understand our life in the world. That is of course Zeno's point. He was defending an Eleatic monism, a sort of Hellenic gaslighting that told the world nothing is as it seems, so he was committed to saying that since the apparent world is illusory, something crazy must be true. Maybe this is irrelevant now, because we live in the thought world that Leibniz and Newton gave us with the development of calculus. The central idea is that of a converging series. Consider continuously compounding interest. You probably have bank accounts that earn it. You do not regard this as a mystery. But how can that be compute...