You are looking for a second consecutive day at a fossil-disclosed jungle cat inspired by thought experiments over whether p was true already in ancient times. I go back today to the issue raised in the Canadian Journal of Philosophy in an article earlier this year by Fabio Lampert and John William Waldrop. The point is not to settle the issue of what is free will and is it real. The point, rather, is in logical analytical fashion to render clear "previously underappreciated constraints on defenses of closure-based arguments against the existence of free will." Who are they? Lampert is affiliated with the University of Vienna, apparently a postdoctoral researcher there. Waldrop's affiliation is with Notre Dame. They seem often to have worked together. As I understand it, they are saying that various promising arguments against free will require a principle of closure, and that whether they have such a principle available in the sens...
In the Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Fabio Lampert and John William Waldrop recently offered a rather confusing argument about free will. They didn't argue for it or against it precisely, but sought to outline what a solid argument for it or against it might look like. They seem sure that no sound argument to either conclusion has appeared yet, despite the voluminous attempts. "Free will and intensional operators" is the title of their article, in the February 2026 issue. As one might expect, the phrase "intensional operators" plays a big part in their discussion. So does the word "closure". They don't really define what they mean by [epistemic] closure in this context, but I expect that it means here that for any domain of discussion X, the domain is closed if and only if we can safely add to our knowledge by taking the enatilment of what we know as also ... known. [This is different from causal closure.] Free will, for Lampert and Waldrop,...