At the end of August I wrote here about Francesco Orsi's 2015 book, simply titled VALUE THEORY. Here is a quote from the book, from a chapter called "Personal Value." "The agent-relativized structure can make sense of a range of situations where we think it morally significant that the agent was involved. I need to repay my debt to my creditor, but I learn that I could help B repaying her higher debts to her creditors . But if I do this, I will be unable to pay my debts.... I have an overriding duty to repay my debt. According to agent-relative consequentialism, this is because repaying my debt is better relative to me than repaying others' debts. Analogous examples can be multiplied at will." This makes sense to me. How sympathetic do we have to make B's distressed circumstances in order to release the agent relativity here? Of course, as Orsi also says, this must be understood with a "ceteris paribus" clause. He doesn't expand...