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Simpson's Paradox

 


My random reading in matters mathematical has brought me to Simpson's Paradox, the idea that a clear trend in a group of data can disappear, or even reverse, when different groups of data that taken severally exhibit the same trend are aggregated. 

It is named for Edward Simpson, who described the effect in "The Interpretation of Interaction in Contingency Tables" in the Journal of the Royal Statistical Society in 1951.

Colin Blyth rediscovered this paper and gave the phenomenon the name Simpson's Paradox in a 1972 paper.

It was once referenced in an episode of the prime-time cartoon The Simpsons because ... well, the name.

Wikipedia has a good discussion.

This is not really a "paradox" at all, though the name will probably stick.  It wouldn't impress Zeno, or whoever started the thing about the lying Cretan. But the phrase "Simpson's odd-seeming phenomenon" doesn't seem very resonant. 

Good brief discussion in pp. 70 - 72 of Titelbaum, Fundamentals of Bayesian epistemology.

The following example comes from Titelbaum's book. It involves two basketball pros active in the 2016-2017 season in the NBA: James Harden of the Houston Rockets and DeMar DeRozan of the Toronto Raptors. 

1. Harden made a higher percentage of his two-point shots than DeRozan.

2. Harden also made a higher percentage of his three-point shots than DeRozan.

Given both of those facts, you probably would not expect this:

3. Harden made a smaller percentage of his overall shots than DeRozan. 

Aggregation can kill a trend. The forest can be very different from the trees.  Insert some other cliche here. I know, right?  

Comments

  1. Facts are pretty crucial to getting to the crux of anything. If one bases a conclusion on less than all of them, one's *conclusion* is no more than an educated inference. Inference does not=reality in such matters. I would hold that the "paradox" is not a paradox at all---only an incomplete assessment. Jack Webb, in *Dragnet*: gimme the facts, m'am, just the facts*.
    [I used to do some administrative law work]

    ReplyDelete
  2. This is, arguably, diissociated from paradox...maybe. Today, I read a post on "elite, social justice activism". That struck me as odd. At best. The terms, *elite*, and, *social justice * are mutually contradictory, if not outright antagonistic, seems to me. When did elitists become advocates of social justice? Answer: when phrases such as *effective altruism* and a more-or-less similar characterization of philanthropy surfaced, d'aurtrement (spelling?), they are not. I could not log a comment on the blog, without committing money. Ding! Lost my attention, tout de suite. Et, non, mon tablet, il ne parle pas Francais, o, Espanol. Love your posts, ami.
    Carry on.

    ReplyDelete

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