Skip to main content

Three Dimensions or Four?

Image result for bicycle door stop


There are surely respects in which the notion of “space-time” as a unitary block, the view of time as
just one of its dimensions, has served a useful role in the further development of science
and technology. Insofar as it does, we might accept it pragmatically as true.  But (secondly)
broad propositions are often ambiguous, even when not obviously so, and in the case of any
ambiguity it is always open to us to say that the statement or the idea is true in one respect, false
in another.


What might tempt us even at an early blush to suspect that there are respects in which this idea
is false? There are the various ambiguities and paradoxes that come with the idea. Consider the
bicycle in the doorway as an example.


A bicycle stands in an open doorway such that the front of the bike is inside the house, the back of
the door is outside. A philosopher asks us, “Well, is the bike in the house or not?” We might well
reply, “some parts are, some parts are not.” Simple enough, one would think.


But can we do that with regard to the dimension of time? Suppose our bicycle came into existence
at T1 and ceased to exist at T100. Isn’t the bike wholly present at each of those times? At T1, at T2,
at T3, and so forth? It isn’t intuitively  plausible to say that only part of the bike, or certain parts of the
bike, are present prior to T20 and that other parts become present after T20. We can say that with
regard to space and the physical threshold of the doorway, but we don’t want to talk like that as to time.


Of course we might say that the bicycle at T21 was rusty whereas the bicycle at T3 still had
that pristine right-from-the-factory look. Then the bicycle at, say, T40 was newly cleaned and
painted and looked pristine once again. But what we want to say is that the same bike was present
at all of these times, and that different predicates were true of that subject at the different time, not
that it was a different object, or even a different part of the one object. So there is something a bit
“off” about treating time, and in such a case the age of the bicycle, as merely another dimension,
quite analogous to its length.  


It may be that the world is made up of subatomic particles that don’t rust (or do anything analogous
to rusting) over time. In such a case, we would surely want to say that a proton at its T41 is  
identical to what it was at T40 and will still be identical at T42 etc. In such a case, too, we might
also be tempted to say that the three-dimensionality of space is a more fundamental fact than the
four dimensionality of space-time.

Comments

Popular posts from this blog

A Story About Coleridge

This is a quote from a memoir by Dorothy Wordsworth, reflecting on a trip she took with two famous poets, her brother, William Wordsworth, and their similarly gifted companion, Samuel Taylor Coleridge.   We sat upon a bench, placed for the sake of one of these views, whence we looked down upon the waterfall, and over the open country ... A lady and gentleman, more expeditious tourists than ourselves, came to the spot; they left us at the seat, and we found them again at another station above the Falls. Coleridge, who is always good-natured enough to enter into conversation with anybody whom he meets in his way, began to talk with the gentleman, who observed that it was a majestic waterfall. Coleridge was delighted with the accuracy of the epithet, particularly as he had been settling in his own mind the precise meaning of the words grand, majestic, sublime, etc., and had discussed the subject with William at some length the day before. “Yes, sir,” says Coleridge, “it is a majesti

Searle: The Chinese Room

John Searle has become the object of accusations of improper conduct. These accusations even have some people in the world of academic philosophy saying that instructors in that world should try to avoid teaching Searle's views. That is an odd contention, and has given rise to heated exchanges in certain corners of the blogosphere.  At Leiter Reports, I encountered a comment from someone describing himself as "grad student drop out." GSDO said: " This is a side question (and not at all an attempt to answer the question BL posed): How important is John Searle's work? Are people still working on speech act theory or is that just another dead end in the history of 20th century philosophy? My impression is that his reputation is somewhat inflated from all of his speaking engagements and NYRoB reviews. The Chinese room argument is a classic, but is there much more to his work than that?" I took it upon myself to answer that on LR. But here I'll tak

Five Lessons from the Allegory of the Cave

  Please correct me if there are others. But it seems to be there are five lessons the reader is meant to draw from the story about the cave.   First, Plato  is working to devalue what we would call empiricism. He is saying that keeping track of the shadows on the cave wall, trying to make sense of what you see there, will NOT get you to wisdom. Second, Plato is contending that reality comes in levels. The shadows on the wall are illusions. The solid objects being passed around behind my back are more real than their shadows are. BUT … the world outside the the cave is more real than that — and the sun by which that world is illuminated is the top of the hierarchy. So there isn’t a binary choice of real/unreal. There are levels. Third, he equates realness with knowability.  I  only have opinions about the shadows. Could I turn around, I could have at least the glimmerings of knowledge. Could I get outside the cave, I would really Know. Fourth, the parable assigns a task to philosophers