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Money Week, Part II





Yesterday, we spoke of a former cryptocurrency honcho, now hoping for an international prisoner exchange that night free him. Tomorrow we will speak of old-fashioned government-fiat money and the role it plays within Keynesian economics. 

Today, I offer a quotation from an ancient philosopher. A Stoic, Epictetus, said this about money. He imagines that a friend has asked him to go earn some quick money and then share it. He replies to this hypothetical friend. 

"If I can get it while maintaining my self-respect, trustworthiness, and high-mindedness, show me the way and I'll et some. But if you're asking me to lose my good qualities so that you can get things that aren't even good, you can see how unfair and unfeeling you're being. What would you rather have, money or a trustworthy and self-respecting friend?"  


Comments

  1. What Epictetus adds to what his friend asked him -- that the friend wants to use the money for "things that aren't even good" -- makes it too easy a case. Suppose the friend wanted Epictetus to sacrifice his self-respect, trustworthiness, and high-mindedness to earn some quick money so that the friend can purchase a life-saving drug for his child. That's a tougher case.

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    Replies
    1. In the context of the long ages before effective medicines, including Epictetus' whole lifetime, you comment would have seemed silly. Ministrations were quite likely to kill a sick child by interfering with the natural restorative powers that allow many of the to overcome many of the illnesses that ail them. Calling in a physician and apothecary wasn't i fact, "even good." In the 21st century: yes, you might quarrel.

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  2. OK. Change my hypothetical either to the 21st century or to food for a starving child, even in ancient times.

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