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On the Vienna Circle: Eight of Eight

 


Let us finally say something about two deaths: the murder that justifies the title of the book we have been discussing, "The Murder of Professor Schlick," and four decades later the mental-illness driven death of the mathematician/logician Kurt Godel.  

On the morning of June 22, 1936, Schlick was due to present his final lecture of the semester to his class at Vienna University. He took Tram D and arrived at the University at 9:15. He walked through the iron gate, down the hall, and turned right onto a staircase. Students in Room 41 were waiting for him. 

He must have walked right past Johann Nelbock on his way. Nelbock, a mentally unhinged student, had become extremely agitated by a lecture Schlick had given on immortality earlier in the semester. (For the positivists, there was a puzzle as to whether the claim of immortality was even meaningful.)  

After Schlick walked past him, Nelbock ran forward to get ahead of Schlick, turned around and fired four bullets at him. As he did this, he apparently shouted, "Now you damned bastard! Have at it!"

Schlick died, of course (two of the bullets passed through his heart), and Nelbock waited patiently for the arrival of the police. There wasn't much material for a whodunnit here. 

The following month, an article appeared in the journal PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW about the principle of verification. The author defended that principle against some of its critics. 

This author was ... the newly deceased Moritz Schlick. And the article uses an example from that lecture earlier in the year, mentioned parenthetically above. The posthumous article says there is a puzzle about whether the statement "After my death I will continue to exist" is meaningful. But Schlick concludes that it IS meaningful, because it is in principle verifiable. "I can easily imagine, e.g., witnessing the funeral of my own body." 

Whether he survived in that sense or not, his departure from this embodied life had a devastating consequence for the Circle -- it had lost its center. Edmonds tells us that Waismann soon thereafter visited Wittgenstein's younger sister Gretl, to see if she could persuade Ludwig to return from the British isles to Vienna. "The idea" Edmonds says, "seems to have been that he would replace Schlick." Gretl apparently told Schlick that her family would never "let itself be used like that."  

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I want to conclude this, though, by speaking of Godel. I first encountered him as one of the stars of Douglas Hofstadter's book, Godel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid.

Godel (1906 - 1978) is best known for the "incompleteness theorem" in mathematics, the proof that there are limits to provability in all formal axiomatic systems. There will always be truths that cannot be proven. One sensible extension, contrary to Vienna Circle notions, is that since there will always be unproven truths,  it is unwise to tie together too closely the ideas of truth and of proof -- perhaps it is even less wise to tie together meaning and verification. 

Godel proved his incompleteness theorem by making an innovative use of the Liar's Paradox. Remember, in the standard version the Cretan is imagined to say,"This is a lie." We are then expected to ask ourselves, is THAT a lie, or is it true? 

Godel shows that it is possible to code that sort of statement into arithmetical form. He coded into that form the following statement: "This statement is unprovable." If that statement is provable, it is false. If it is false, it cannot be provable. The only way to escape paradox is to regard the statement at issue to be, in fact, true. Given the assertion it codes, this implies that is is also unprovable. So there is at least one true-but-unprovable statement in any system for which this coding can be accomplished.   

As we mentioned earlier in this discussion, VC member Tarski proposed banishing the troublesome underlying paradox by creating a formal language with a strict hierarchy, so that a self-referential statement of the sort in question can never be made.

One way of understanding Godel's showing is that Tarski's banishment isn't so easily accomplished as all that. The hierarchies tend to become tangled as they are elaborated, and the paradoxes find a way to recur.  

As to the Vienna Circle, Godel seems to have attended a lot of the meetings, and to have kept his own counsel. Schlick's view of mathematics and logic was a logicist one, in accord with his admiration for Russell: they are both collections of tautologies. Edmonds said that Godel silently disagreed with this notion, but that he did credit the VC with helping to awaken his interest in the foundations of the subjects.  He published his incompleteness theorem in 1931, after having submitted it for his doctoral thesis at the University of Vienna. By 1940 (when he arrived in New Jersey as a refugee) he was famous ... in the world of mathematicians and logicians. 

The story of HOW Godel and his wife got to New Jersey is itself fascinating, but I leave it aside for your own researches. He happily became there a neighbor and a friend of a hero of his: Albert Einstein. 

Godel's later life, and his death, tug at my heart strings.  Einstein's death in 1955 was a great blow to him. Godel became ever more reclusive, and more paranoid, after that, in a decline both physical and mental that lasted 23 years. In 1977 his wide Adele had to go to the hospital for an operation. When she returned, she found him both paranoid and dangerously wasted away. He had not been eating, convinced someone was trying to poison him. Godel was taken to the hospital but continued to deteriorate. He died in January of the following year. His death certificate describes the case of death, "malnutrition and inanition, caused by personality disturbance," Edmonds reports.

So Godel's death was only quite recent when Hofstadter made his name one of the three building blocks of his title (1979). 

We have now covered all the material that I aspired to cover from Edmonds' fascinating work. I have only to say that a few closing words. 

The Circle seems in retrospect like a stone fortress that, once habitable and defensible, stood grandly on a tidal island.  The erosive power of the tides eventually brought it down, and made it not only uninhabitable but unfathomable. Still ... beneath the waves of the contemporary world a lot of treasure, along with a lot of dross, lies buried from the days of this old Viennese fortress. Mining the treasures may properly engage adventurous minds for decades to come. 


Comments

  1. Schlick concludes that the statement, "After my death I will continue to exist" is meaningful, because "it is in principle verifiable. 'I can easily imagine, e.g., witnessing the funeral of my own body.'" But if "I" can imagine witnessing the funeral of my own body," who is the "I," who has no body? It can only be Schlick's soul, but the existence of souls is not verifiable.

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    1. The line was in the book, and in my precis, chiefly because of the odd fittingness of such a thought in a posthumous publication. Still -- we might think about it this way. I'll inevitably use Jamesian lingo: If we try to imagine such a thing, we are thinking of the continuity of Thought, which recognizes itself, NOT of the sourcing of that thought. The stream of consciousness, not the contours of the streambed. There would be a Thought, which would identify itself with memories of the life of Moritz Schlick, and this Thought would include an awareness of place (say, a few meters above a graveyard). This Thought would not necessarily include any knowledge of "how I got here or what I am at this moment". Indeed, it might include a great deal of puzzlement at that. Just as much happens in the world at which one is puzzled. It would surely be no more confusing that the blooming buzzing confusion of a newborn baby.

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  2. You're going mystical on me, Christopher, so I can't follow you, because I live in the world that consists of "all that is the case," and in that world "thought" is a common noun and therefore should not be capitalized. My advice is to remember, "What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence."

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    1. The time for that silence comes about only after we have climbed up to wherever the ladder of our conceptualizations may lead us. Then we can step off onto the new plateau and throw away the ladder. Personally, I'm still climbing, so I still need the ladder. And (to revert to James) "Thought" means something different from "thought". On my ladder, I need them both.

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    2. In case you didn't see this: https://existentialcomics.com/comic/551

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  3. In the cartoon, when Wittgenstein says, "But it is in use," he is switching from the philosophy of the Tractatus to that of the Philosophical Investigations. That implies that the Tractatus would not have considered self-referential statements to be meaningful. Is that true of the Tractatus? Then, when Carnap says, "It just means not in use in the normal way," he is attributing meaning to the sign. Would the Vienna Circle have attributed meaning to self-referential statements? Am I taking the cartoon too seriously?

    I hadn't seen the cartoon, because I don't subscribe to them. Is there a way to subscribe?

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    1. This comment has been removed by the author.

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    2. I don't subscribe either -- I just regularly visit the website, as you do mine. But if you want to subscribe, (or "become a member") go here: https://www.patreon.com/join/ExistentialComics?redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.existentialcomics.com%2Fcomic%2F554&utm_medium=widget. I love the descriptions of the levels of membership there. You can get the basic subscription for only $1 a month. You will only go with the $100 a month level if you are "an actual Medici."

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