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A New Book about Truth



Cezary Cieslinski has written a new book about the place of the concept of truth within epistemology, and the history of questions about that place.

Its title? THE EPISTEMIC LIGHTNESS OF TRUTH.

Obviously this touches on matter central to the concerns of this blog. And it has nothing at all to do with the horror film "Truth or Dare?" whence comes this illustration.

For now, though, all I will do is refer you, dear reader, to a discussion of this column in Notre Dame Philosophical Review. 

Here is the link:

https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/the-epistemic-lightness-of-truth-deflationism-and-its-logic/

Unfortunately, I am not sufficiently up on the argumentative context to make sense of that review, so I doubt I'd be able to make sense of the book.

Consider this claim, from the reviewer: "Cieslinski does not accept semantic conservativeness as a precondition for an axiomatic truth theory being deflationist." If your response to that sentence is "gee why doesn't he? Is he saying a deflationist theory of truth can be axiomatic without semantic conservativeness? I must know more!" then and only then is this book for you. 



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