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A quote from Brandom

 


I only quite recently learned a new philosophical word, "inferentialism".  It is the view, especially associated with Robert Brandom, that a concept derives its meaning from its use in a network of inferences, and that accordingly a word or expression has its meaning only because and when users can employ it within such a network.

This is a contention within the philosophy of language that has consequences in philosophy of mind and epistemology.

That is Brandom above, with a parrot.  A creature that can use lots of words ad phases but has no real skill at inference.

If you tell your parrot "it is raining today," he may or may not pick it up and say back to you "it is raining today." He will surely not say, "so you better be careful when you go for a drive tomorrow on those wet roads."   

Importantly, this is a non-representational theory.  The phrase "it is raining" does not derive its meaning from the drops of hydrogen bonded with oxygen that are descending toward the grounds as one speaks.  That connection is non-primitive. What is more fundamental is the connection between "it is raining" and other nodes in the network. 

In Brandom's words, 

"Saying or thinking that things are thus-and-so is undertaking a distinctive kind of inferentially articulated commitment: putting it forward as a fit premise for further inferences, that is, authorizing its use as such a premise, and undertaking responsibility to entitle oneself to that commitment, to vindicate one’s authority, under suitable circumstances, paradigmatically by exhibiting it as the conclusion of an inference from other such commitments to which one is or can become entitled."  

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  1. HenryAugust 11, 2026 at 7:35 AM

    Brandom is not a good writer. His words up to "such a premise" are clear: "It is raining" is a fit premise for "the roads are wet." I do not know what purpose the next phrase -- "and undertaking responsibility to entitle oneself to that commitment" -- serves or what it means in practice; could one put a statement forward as a fit premise for further inference and not undertake responsibility to entitle oneself to that commitment? Whatever that means.

    Next we come to a separate point that, for clarity, should be in a separate sentence. Saying or thinking that things are thus-and-so can be not only the premise of an inference, but a conclusion of one. "It is raining" could be a conclusion from "water is falling from the sky and it is not being released from an airplane or any other object in the sky." As in his previous point, "commitments to which one is or can become entitled" has no apparent meaning.

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